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I. INTRODUCTION

Thirty years have passed since the Supreme Court, in the landmark case
of Furman v. Georgia,' temporarily abolished the death penalty in the

United States.2 During those thirty years, Americans have continued a
passionate, public debate on the morality, wisdom, effectiveness, and
legality of capital punishment.3 To be sure, the death penalty remains one
of the most controversial subjects in American law.'
Today, a new question has emerged at the heart of the death penalty
debate in American jurisprudence. Who should be entrusted with the grim
task of determining whether a capital defendant deserves to die: the judge
or the jury? Thirty-eight states allow capital defendants to be sentenced to
death.' In twenty-nine of those states, the jury alone is responsible for the
sentencing of capital defendants.' In five states, the sentencing decision is

1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curian).
2. Id. at 239-40. The Court declared that the "imposition and carrying out of the death
penalty... constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments." Id.
3. See AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 5 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998).
As Clarence Darrow observed:
"The question of capital punishment has been the subject of endless discussion
and will probably never be settled so long as men believe in punishment.
[Q]uestions of this sort, or perhaps of any sort, are not settled by reason; they are
settled by prejudices and sentiments or by emotion. When they are settled they do
not stay settled, for the emotions change as new stimuli are applied to the
machine."
RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 3 (2001).

4. LOUIS J. PALMER, JR., THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO
(1998). From 1976, when the death penalty was

UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS I

reinstated, to the end of 2002, there have been 820 executions in the United States. Emily Kaiser,
Illinois Gov. Commutes All Death Sentences, REUTERS, Jan. 11, 2003, at http://www.reuters.com/
newsArticle.jhtml?type-topNews+storyID=2028659 (last visited Jan. 15, 2003). Currently, there
are approximately 3,700 men and women on death row in the United States awaiting execution. Id.
5. For a complete list of the thirty-eight states that have authorized the death penalty in
capital cases, see infra notes 6-8.
6. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602 (Michie 2002); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (Deering

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss3/5

2

Diamond: The Sixth Amendment: Where Did the Jury Go? Florida's Flawed Sent
FLORIDA S FL4WED SENTENCiNG IN DEATH PENALTY CASES

left in the hands of the judge. 7 Four states, including Florida, have a hybrid
system, in which the jury plays an advisory role, but the judge makes the
ultimate sentencing decision.'
In Ring v. Arizona,9 a death row prisoner challenged Arizona's
sentencing statute, which allowed the judge, rather than the jury, to find
the aggravating factors necessary for the imposition of the death penalty.' °
Timothy Ring argued that this sentencing scheme violated his Sixth
Amendment guarantee to a trial by jury. " A majority of the United States
that the Arizona sentencing scheme did
Supreme Court agreed, and held
12
Amendment.
Sixth
the
violate
Most obviously, the Court's decision in Ring required the Arizona
legislature to rewrite its sentencing laws to give juries a greater role in
sentencing capital defendants. 3 More broadly, Ring has called into
question the constitutionality of sentencing schemes in nine states,
affecting over eight hundred convicted inmates on death row.' 4 The Florida
Supreme Court recently considered the appeals of two death-row inmates,
Linroy Bottoson and Amos King, so it could fully review the
constitutionality of Florida's death sentencing procedure. 5 Criminal

2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-3 1.1 (Michie
2002); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/9-1(d) (West 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4624(b) (2001);.
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(i)(b) (Michie 2002); LA. CODECRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 905.1 (West
2002); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 2-303 (2002); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (2002); Mo. REv.
STAT. § 565.030 (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 175.552 (Michie 2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:5 (II) (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-3(c) (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-1
(Michie 2002); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (Consol. 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000
(2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (Anderson 2002); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.10(A)
(2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (2001); 42 PA. CONST. STAT. § 9711 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-20(B) (Law. Co-op. 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-2 (Michie 2002); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-204 (2002); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-3-207 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3 (Michie 2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 10.95.050 (West 2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102 (Michie 2002).
7. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(F) (2001); COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-11-103 (2001) (threejudge panel); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (2002); NEB.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-2520 (Michie 2002).
8. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-46, 13A-5-47 (2002); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (2002);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (Michie 2002).
9. 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
10. Id. at 2437.
11. Id. The Sixth Amendment states, in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to a... trial, by an impartial jury... ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
12. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2443.
13. See S.B. 1001, 45th Leg., 5th Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2002).
14. Adam Liptak, A Supreme Court Ruling Rolls Death Penalty Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16,
2002, at A14.
15. See Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002); King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla.
2002); see also John Gibeaut, Florida Flustered: State's High Court Befuddled as CapitalAppeals
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defense attorneys may pursue similar appeals on behalf of death row
prisoners in Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Montana, and
Nebraska. 6 A federal judge in Vermont ruled that, in light of the Court's
decision in Ring, the Federal Death Penalty Act 7 is unconstitutional, for
the law allows evidence that was inadmissible at trial to be used in
sentencing a convicted defendant to death.'" The federal judge presiding
over the trial of Zacaraias Moussaoui, indicted as a co-conspirator in the
September 1 th terrorist attack, ordered the parties to file motions on this
issue before Moussaoui's trial commenced. 9 State legislatures in Arizona,
Colorado, Delaware, and Nebraska have already convened in special
session to rewrite their state sentencing laws.2° In short, prosecutors,
defense attorneys, judges, and lawmakers across the country are struggling
to comprehend the far-reaching ramifications of the Court's decision.
What role must the jury play in sentencing capital defendants in federal
and state courts? May the jury merely recommend a sentence to the judge,
who can then overrule the jury's recommendation? Or does the Sixth
Amendment require the jury to have the complete authority and final say
in the sentencing decision? Part II of this Note will trace the jury's
historical role in sentencing capital defendants, from the English jury of
.the late sixteenth century to the modem Americanjury of the late twentieth
century. Part III will examine the Court's opinion in Ring and address the
Court's effectiveness in redefining the role of the jury in sentencing capital
defendants. Part IV will argue that Florida's hybrid sentencing scheme,
where the jury's role in sentencing is merely advisory, violates the Sixth
Amendment guarantee to a trial by jury as interpreted by the Supreme
Court in Ring. Moreover, Part IV will propose judicial and legislative
reforms to ameliorate the constitutional flaws in Florida's death penalty
sentencing statutes.
Come Up, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2002, at 42; Mary Ellen Klas, FloridaDeath Penalty Law Challenged,
Cox NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 21, 2002; James R. Langford, Court Ruling Puts Death Sentences in
Doubt, FLA. TODAY, July 26, 2002, at 1; Warren Richey, FloridaDeath-PenaltyBattle Rages Over
Sentencing, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 13, 2002, at 2; Jay Weaver, Appeal Imperils
Florida Death Penalty, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 7, 2002, at I B. I discuss the Bottoson and King
decisions in detail. See infra Part IV.
16. The Joy of Doing One's Own Bidding: A Jury Must Decide, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 5, 2002,
atC8.
17. 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 3591-3594 (Law. Co-op 2002).
18. See United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469 (2002); see also Pam Belluck, Second
Ruling Against US. Death Penalty,N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 25, 2002, at Al 5.
19. United States v. Moussaoui, No. 90-246551,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13326 (E.D. Va. July
11, 2002); see also Philip Shenon, Traces of Terror: The Terror Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
2002, at A16.
20. See S.B. 1001, 45th Leg., 5th Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2002); H.B. 005S, 63d Leg., 3d
Extraordinary Sess. (Colo. 2002); S.B. 449, 141 st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2001); L.B. 1,97th
Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Neb. 2002).
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II. TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE:2 1 THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE
JURY IN DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING

A. The Role of the English Jury and the OriginalIntent of the
Sixth Amendment Jury Trial Guarantee
When the Bill of Rights was adopted in the late eighteenth century, the
English jury served as the model for the new, American jury system.2 An
understanding of the development of the English jury will provide
important insight into what role the Framers intended the American jury
to play in the trial and sentencing of capital defendants. 3
The early English jury was responsible for all findings of fact in the
trial and the sentencing of criminal defendants. 4 The responsibilities of the
judge were quite limited: he was to preside over the trial and decide
questions of law.25 As well-known commentator and legal scholar Sir
William Blackstone observed, all factual determinations in the trial and
sentencing of defendants were reserved for "a competent number of
sensible and upright jurymen, chosen by lot from among those of the
middle rank."26 Blackstone argued that the jury "will be found the best
investigators of truth, and the surest guardians of public justice."27 One of
Blackstone's lesser-known contemporaries, Sir Edward Wynne, offered
the point emphatically: "'All that I have said or have to say upon the
subject of Juries, is agreeable to this established maxim: "that Juries must
answer to questions of Fact and Judges to questions of Law."".' 2
Early English juries determined questions of fact because the jurors
themselves were selected from the community based on their own,
personal knowledge of the events and facts of the case.29 The jury was not
21. I borrow this phrase from the work TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE: THE CRIMINAL TRIAL
JURY INENGLAND, 1200-1800 (J.S. Cockburn & Thomas A. Green eds., 1988).
22. See Welsh S. White, Fact-Findingand the Death Penalty: The Scope of a Capital
Defendant's Right to Jury Trial, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 5 (1989).
23. See id. at 5.
24. See id.
at 5-6.
25. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
297-98 (Wayne Morrison ed., 2001).
26. Id.at 298. Blackstone recognized that the jury served as an important check against the
powers of the aristocracy. The jury "prevents the encroachments of the more powerful and wealthy
citizens. Every new tribunal, erected for the decision of facts, without the intervention of ajury...
is a step towards establishing aristocracy, the most oppressive of absolute governments." Id.
27. Id.
28. White, supra note 22, at 4 (quoting E. WYNNE, 3 EUNOMUS: DIALOGUES CONCERNING
THE LAW AND CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND 217 (2d ed. 1785)).
29. See Thomas A. Green, The Jury and the English Law ofHomicide, 1200-1600, 74 MICH.
L. REV. 413, 424 (1976). "The early English jury was self-informing and composed of persons
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composed of impartial men, but men who had witnessed the homicide, or
knew the defendant personally." As a result, the early English jury had
complete and final say in whether a death sentence was appropriate in a
certain case."
By the seventeenth century, however, the criminal trial in England had
changed.32 Jurors were no longer selected based on their personal
knowledge of the facts of the case; rather, jurors considered witness
testimony, and rendered their verdict and sentenced the defendant based
on the evidence presented.3 Since the jurors no longer had first-hand
knowledge of the parties or facts in a dispute, the judge, who was
appointed directly by the Crown, exerted far greater influence over the
jury's decisionmaking.3 4 It was not uncommon for a judge to threaten a
jury with fines or even imprisonment if they failed to render the verdict or
impose the sentence desired by the Crown.3"
This fear of unchecked judicial power gave rise to a new rule in
English law: the judge could not fine or imprison jurors simply because he
disagreed with their decisions on a verdict or a sentence.36 By the time the
Bill of Rights was adopted at the end ofthe eighteenth century, the English
jury was the sole and impartial fact-finder in all criminal cases.37
Moreover, it was the jury alone who determined whether a convicted,
capital defendant should be sentenced to death.3

supposed to have first-hand knowledge of the events and persons in question. The judge instructed
the jury on the law, but was himself almost entirely dependent upon the jury for his knowledge of
the case." Id. at 414.
30. See id. at 424.
31. As Professor White explains, the law of homicide in early England was extraordinarily
harsh. White, supra note 22, at 6. As a result, the jury often mitigated the severity of the law by
finding the facts in a manner to restrict the imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 6-7.
32. Id. at 7.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. Commentators have documented several dramatic examples ofjudicial influence over
jury decisionmaking in English law:
"[A] master's helper had beaten a boy 'about the head with a broomstaff for
doing careless work. Kelynge would not accept a verdict of manslaughter and
threatened the jury with a fine. This produced the result he wanted: murder was
found, and the defendant was hanged, in spite of the recommendation of
'gentlemen' of the county that he be spared."
Id. at 8-9 (footnote omitted).
36. Id. at 9 & n.62. This rule was articulated in Bushell's Case, decided in 1670. See Case
of the Imprisonment of Edward Bushell, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1012 (1670).
37. White, supra note 22, at 9-11.
38. Id.
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In drafting the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the
Framers recognized that the jury system served as a fundamental check on
official power. a9 Given the judicial coercion present in English history, the
Framers were quite reluctant to "entrust plenary powers over the life and
liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group ofjudges."4' Thus, inherent
in the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury is the Framers'
intent that the jury would have the complete and sole authority to decide
facts, render a verdict, and select a sentence-without judicial or official
intervention."
B. Ignoring OriginalIntent: The Supreme Court Approves Judicial
Fact-Findingand Sentencing in Walton v. Arizona
For the early English commentators and the Framers of the United
States Constitution, the issue was straightforward: a jury had the sole
authority as fact-finder to determine the appropriate sentence for a capital
defendant. In modem American jurisprudence, however, the Supreme
Court has struggled with which facts may be determined by a jury, and
which facts may be determined by a judge.42
In 1990, an Arizona man convicted of first degree murder and
sentenced to death by ajudge, contended that the judge-imposed sentence
violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.43 Timothy Walton and
two accomplices robbed an off-duty Marine in a parking lot in Tuscon,

Throughout its history, the jury determined which homicide defendants would be
subject to capital punishment by making factual determinations, many of which
related to difficult assessments of the defendant's state of mind. By the time the
Bill of Rights was adopted, the jury's right to make these determinations was
unquestioned.
Id. at 10-11 (footnotes omitted).
39. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
40. Id. at 156.
41. Id. at 155-56.
The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a
profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice
If the defendant preferred the common-sensejudgment of ajury
administered ....
to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he
was to have it.
Id.
42. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, the Court held that in certain instances the judge will be
permitted to make factual determinations that lead to enhanced sentencing. 477 U.S. 79, 92-93
(1986). And in Spaziano v. Florida, the Court held that a capital defendant does not have a right
to jury determination as to sentencing. 468 U.S. 477, 459 (1984).
43. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647 (1990).
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Arizona and then forced the man into their car and drove him out into the
desert.44 Walton pulled the man out of the car and shot him once in the
head.4" The man's body was found approximately one week later, after
Walton was arrested and led police to the murder site.46 The medical
examiner determined that the man had been blinded by the shot, but was
not immediately killed.47 Instead, the man had floundered around in the
desert, and ultimately died from dehydration, starvation, and pneumonia,
only one day before his body was found.4"
A jury convicted Walton of first degree murder, and the trial judge
conducted a separate sentencing hearing without the jury present.49 When
sentencing Walton, the judge accepted two aggravating circumstances:
"(1) [t]he murder was committed 'in an especially heinous, cruel or
depraved manner,' and (2) 'the murder was committed for pecuniary
gain.' 50 The judge also considered mitigating circumstances in Walton's
favor, including testimony from a psychiatrist who opined that Walton had
a long history of substance abuse that may have impaired his judgment,
that Walton may have been abused sexually as a child, and that Walton
was only twenty-years-old at the time of the murder."' Thejudge sentenced
Walton to death, and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction
and sentence.52
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Walton argued that
every finding of fact underlying a sentencing decision must be made by a
jury, not a judge. Walton further asserted that the Arizona sentencing
scheme would only be constitutional if the jury determined the presence
of aggravating and mitigating factors in a case.54
The Court, however, rejected this argument. In its decision, the Court
noted that it had repeatedly rejected challenges to Florida's death penalty
statute, which provided for sentencing by the judge, not the jury. 55 The
Court then reasoned that the Arizona sentencing statute was quite similar
to the Florida statute. 6 In Florida, the jury may recommend a sentence, but
the jury does not assist the judge in finding aggravating and mitigating

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 644.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 644-45.
Id. at 645.
Id. (quoting ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(6) (1989)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 647.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 648.
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factors, and the jury's recommendation is not binding on the judge.57 Thus,
the Court concluded that since a Florida judge does not need a jury's
assistance in sentencing capital defendants, neither should an Arizona
judge-who may impose a sentence without even so much as a jury's
recommendation. 8 Therefore, relying in large part on its precedent
rejecting the constitutional challenges to Florida's sentencing scheme,59
the Court concluded that Arizona's sentencing laws did not violate the
Sixth Amendment.6" Walton's death sentence was affirmed.6
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Court had
unwisely enlarged the powers of a judge to make sentencing
determinations, and intruded upon the fact-finding function that has been
historically entrusted to the jury. 62 The dissent asserted that the Court was
63 If
shutting the jury out of "'questions of the most momentous concern.' ,,
Walton's case had been decided in 1791, when the Sixth Amendment
became law, the outcome would have been clear.64 By that time, the jury's
role in finding facts to determine whether a defendant should be sentenced
to death was well established. 65 Thus, according to the dissent, the Court's
decision was a radical departure from the original intent of the Sixth
Amendment, in which "'the truth of every accusation, whether preferred
in the shape of indictment, information, or appeal, should afterwards be
confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals
and
66
neighbors, indifferently chosen and superior to all suspicion."
Despite the dissent's charge that the Court ignored the original intent
of the Sixth Amendment, the Court had asserted in an earlier decision that
67
it makes more sense forjudges, not juries, to sentence capital defendants.
Sentencing by a judge, as opposed to a jury, would lead to greater

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.For further discussion of Florida's sentencing scheme, see infra Part IV.
Id.
Id. at 648-49.
Id.at 649.
Id. at 656.
Id. at 713 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 714 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Id.at 710 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.at 713 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
"Throughout its history, the jury determined which homicide defendants would
be subject to capital punishment by making factual determinations, many of which
related to difficult assessments of the defendant's state of mind. By the time the
Bill of Rights was adopted, the jury's right to make these determinations )was
unquestioned."

Id.at 710-11 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting White, supra note 22, at 10-11).
66. Id. at 712 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted in original).
67. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 5
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

consistency in the imposition of capital punishment." After all, a trial
judge is more experienced in sentencing than ajury, and would be able to
impose similar sentences in analogous cases.69
Thus, with the Court's opinion in Walton, it appeared that juries were
no longer constitutionally required to participate in the sentencing phase
of a trial. Yet, ten years after Timothy Walton's death sentence was
affirmed, the Court granted certiorari in a case that would ultimately cast
great doubt on the constitutionality of judicially-imposed sentences.
C. Apprendi v. New Jersey: Reviving the Jury's Role in
Fact-Findingand Sentencing
In Apprendi v. New Jersey,7 petitioner was arrested for shooting into
the home of an African-American family that had recently moved into his
previously all-white neighborhood. 7' A New Jersey grand jury indicted
Apprendi on twenty-three counts for shootings on four different dates, as
well as the unlawful possession of various weapons.72 Apprendi, accepting
an agreement with the State, pled guilty to two counts of second-degree
possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, and one count of the
third-degree offense of unlawful possession of a bomb." The prosecutor
dismissed the remaining charges.74
The judge, in a special evidentiary hearing without the jury present,
found that Apprendi acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or
group of individuals because of their race.7" To reach this conclusion, the
judge considered Apprendi's evidence presented by a psychologist, and
seven character witnesses who testified that he did not have a reputation
for racial bias.76 Apprendi also took the stand himself, and denied that his
crimes were racially motivated.77 The arresting police officer, however,
testified that Apprendi had made derogatory statements against AfricanAmericans.78 Pursuant to the New Jersey hate crime law,79 the trial judge
enhanced his sentence by ten years.8 0
Apprendi appealed his sentence, arguing that the Due Process Clause
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
Id. at469.
Id.
Id. at 469-70.
Id. at 470.
Id. at 470-71.
Id.
Id. at471.
Id.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C-44-3(e) (West 2001).
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471.
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of the Fourteenth Amendment required that the finding of bias used to
enhance his sentence under the hate crime law must be proved to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt." The United States Supreme Court agreed,
finding that the hate crime statute violated both the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment guarantee to a trial
by jury. 2 The Court reasoned that "these rights indisputably entitle a
criminal defendant to 'a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every
element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable
doubt."'83
Much like Justice Stevens' dissent in Walton, the Court in Apprendi
relied heavily on the original intent of the Framers in drafting the Sixth
Amendment." The Court called upon historical treatises which proclaimed
the jury to be "'the great bulwark of [our] civil and political liberties"'8 5
and the "'glory of the English law."' The Sixth Amendment right to a
trial by jury, the Framers feared, would not be lost by "'gross denial, but
by erosion;"' 87 the Court, in Apprendi, sought to stop the erosion of this
constitutional guarantee."8 Thus, the Court held that any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory minimum must be
submitted to the jury." The New Jersey procedure was described as an
"unacceptable departure from the jury tradition that is an indispensable
part of our criminal justice system." °
In dissent, Justice O'Connor,joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Kennedy, and Justice Breyer, argued that not every fact that bears on a
defendant's punishment needs to be submitted to ajury and proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.9 Most significantly, the dissent found the Court's
decision in Apprendi to be completely inconsistent with the Court's
holding in Walton.92 InApprendi, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment
required the jury to find all facts that could enhance a defendant's time in
prison.93 Yet in Walton, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment did not

81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id. at 476-77.
Id. at 477 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)).
See id. at 477-80.
85. Id. at 477 (quoting 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 54041 (4th ed. 1873)).
86. Id. at 479 n.6, 480 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND

87.
88.
89.
90.

343 (1769)).
Id. at 483 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 24748 (1999)).
Id. at 484.
Id. at 490.
Id. at 497.

91. Id. at 524 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 536-39 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 490.
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require the jury to find all facts that could enhance a defendant's sentence
of life imprisonment to death.9 4 How could these two decisions ever be
reconciled?"
III. WHAT FACTS ARE THE JURY'S TO DETERMINE? RING v. ARIZONA:
CLARIFYING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN APPRENDI AND WALTON

The dissenting justices in Apprendi were not alone in their struggle to
resolve the obvious conflicts between Apprendi and Walton. A number of
lower courts found the Court's reasoning in Apprendi and Walton to be
conflicting and confusing.96 The Court granted certiorari in Ring v. Arizona
to allay this uncertainty.97 In Ring, the Court recognized that Apprendi and
Walton were "irreconcilable."" The Court overruled Walton, and held that
capital defendants, no less than non-capital defendants, are entitled to a
jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an
increase in their maximum punishment.99
Timothy Ring was tried in Arizona for armed robbery and murder. 0
In November of 1994, the driver of a Wells Fargo armed van was shot and
killed in a Glendale, Arizona mall parking lot. 0 ' More than $562,000 in
cash and $271,000 in checks were missing from the van.'0 2 Based on an
informant's tip, the police placed wiretaps on Ring's phone.'0 3 The police

94. Id.at 536-37 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
If a State can remove from the jury a factual determination that makes the
difference between life and death, as Walton holds that it can, it is inconceivable
why a State cannot do the same with respect to afactual determination that results
in only a 10-year increase in the maximum sentence to which a defendant is
exposed.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 538 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). The Court's decisions were, in the words of the
dissent, "baffling, to say the least." Id.(O'Connor, I., dissenting).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 159-60 (4th Cir. 2001) (calling the
continued authority of Walton in light ofApprendi "perplexing"); Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523,
542 (9th Cir. 2001) (Gould, J.,concurring) (stating "Apprendi may raise some doubt about
Walton"); People v. Kaczmarek, 741 N.E.2d 1131, 1142 (I11.
App. Ct. 2000) (noting "while it
appears Apprendi extends greater constitutional protections to noncapital, rather than capital,
defendants, the Court has endorsed this precise principle, and we are in no position to second guess
that decision here").
97. See Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct 2428, 2432 (2002).
98. Id.at 2432.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101, Id.at 2432-33.
102, Id.at 2433.
103. Id.
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then engineered local news broadcasts about the robbery investigation that
included several inaccuracies.'04 After viewing the broadcasts, Ring made
several incriminating statements which were recorded by wiretaps.' °5
Police then executed a search warrant at Ring's house,
and discovered a
10 6
duffel bag in his garage containing $271,000 in cash.
At trial, the jury deadlocked on premeditated murder, but convicted
Ring of felony murder occurring in the course of armed robbery.'0 7 Under
Arizona law, Ring could not be put to death unless further factual findings
were made. 0 8 The Arizona sentencing scheme allowed the judge "to
'conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine the existence or
nonexistence of [certain enumerated] circumstances... for the purpose of
determining the sentence to be imposed.'" 0 9 The Arizona statute further
provided that "' [t]he hearing shall be conducted before the court alone.
The court alone shall make all factual determinations required by this
section or the constitution of the United States or this state.""10
The judge considered aggravating and mitigating factors in sentencing
Ring."' First, the judge determined that Ring committed the offense in
exchange for something of pecuniary value, an aggravating factor under
the Arizona statute." 2 Second, the judge found that the offense was
committed in "'an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner.""' 13 In
support of this aggravating factor, the judge relied on the testimony of
Ring's accomplice, who claimed that Ring bragged excessively about his
superb marksmanship." 4 Based on these factual findings, the judge
sentenced Ring to death, and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction. 15
The issue before the Court was whether aggravating factors may be
found by the judge, as required by Arizona law, or whether the Sixth
Amendment jury-trial guarantee requires that the aggravating factors be
determined by a jury." 6 The Court found that the Arizona statute did

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2434.
109. Id.(quoting ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C) (West Supp. 2001) (alterations in
original)).
110. Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. 13-1105(C) (West Supp. 2001)).
111. Id.at2435.
112. Id.
113. Id.(quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G) (West Supp. 2001)).
114. Id.

115. Id. at 2436.
116. Id.at2437.
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violate the Sixth Amendment, and reversed Ring's sentence of death." 7
In its discussion of the conflicting holdings in Walton and Apprendi,
the Court recognized that the "'question is one not of form, but of
effect.""' 8 If a State increases a defendant's punishment contingent on a
finding of fact, that fact must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt." 9 Effectively, the factual finding of an aggravating circumstance
exposed Ring to a greater punishment than was authorized by the jury's
guilty verdict. 20
The State of Arizona argued that even if facts increasing punishment
beyond the maximum authorized by a guilty verdict must be found by a
jury, aggravating circumstances necessary to trigger a death sentence may
nevertheless be reserved by a judge. 2 ' At the heart of Arizona's argument
was "that 'death is different."",122 The judge is better equipped to make a
determination of death because of certain Constitutional constraints, such
as the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment. 3 The Court, however, rejected this argument. "The notion
'that the Eighth Amendment's restrictions on... capital crimes should be
compensated for by permitting States more leeway under the ... Sixth
Amendment ... in proving an aggravating fact necessary to a capital
sentence... is without precedent in our constitutional jurisprudence."124
The Court not only rejected Arizona's sentencing statute; it called into
question, more broadly, the superiority ofjudicial fact-finding in all capital
cases. 25 Entrusting a judge to finding facts necessary to impose a death
sentence might be
"[a]n admirably fair and efficient scheme of criminal justice
designed for a society that is prepared to leave criminal
justice to the State. . . . The founders of the American
Republic were not prepared to leave it to the State, which is
why the jury-trial guarantee was one of the least controversial
provisions of the Bill of Rights."' 26
The Court therefore overruled Walton to the extent that it allows a
sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id. at 2439 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000)).
Id.
See id. at 2439-40.
Id.at 2441.
Id. (citation omitted).

123. Id.

124. Id. at 2442.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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circumstance necessary for the imposition of the death penalty.' The
Court found that the fundamental meaning of the Sixth Amendment jurytrial guarantee is that all facts essential to the imposition of any
punishment that the defendant receives--"whether the statute calls them
elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane-must be found
by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt."' 28

IV.

THE IMPACT OF RING: THE CONSTITUTIONAL FLAWS OF FLORIDA'S
DEATH PENALTY SCHEME

A. Bottoson v. Moore andKing v. Moore: The FloridaJury's Limited
Role in Fact-FindingandSentencing in CapitalCases
On October 24, 2002, the Florida Supreme Court issued its muchanticipated analysis of the impact of Ring on Florida's death penalty
scheme in two cases, Bottoson v. Moore129 and King v. Moore.3 ' To
understand the court's opinions, it is important to first understand the
procedural history of these two death penalty appeals.
In separate cases, Bottoson and King were convicted of murder and
sentenced to death.' On January 23, 2002, the United States Supreme
Court stayed King's execution and on July 8, 2002, stayed Bottoson's
execution. 3 2 The Court placed the cases in abeyance while it decided Ring
v. Arizona.'33 On June 24, 2002, the Court issued its decision in Ring. 34 On
cases,
June 28, 2002, the Court denied certiorari in King's and Bottoson's
13
which automatically allowed their executions to go forward.
Both Bottoson and King petitioned the Florida Supreme Court, arguing
that the Florida death penalty statute was unconstitutional in light of the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Ring. 36 The Florida Supreme
Court, in per curiam opinions, denied Bottoson's and King's petitions for
habeas relief.'37 The Florida Supreme Court reasoned that if the United
States Supreme Court had intended to invalidate the Florida death penalty
statute in Ring, then the Court would not have allowed Bottoson and

127. Id. at 2443.
128. Id.at 2444 (Scalia, J., concurring).
129. 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002).
130. 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam).
131. See Botloson, 833 So. 2d at 694; King, 831 So. 2d at 144.
132. Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 697 (Wells, J., concurring).
133. Id.at 695; King, 831 So. 2d at 144.
134. Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 697 (Wells, J., concurring).
concurring).
135. Id.(Wells, J.,
136. Id.at 695; King,831 So. 2d at 144.
137. Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 695; King, 831 So. 2d at 145.
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King's executions to go forward.' 38
Even though the Florida Supreme Court unanimously rejected
Bottoson's and King's petition for relief, several of the justices of the
court, writing in concurrence, noted that the Ring decision exposed serious
constitutional flaws in Florida's death penalty procedure. 139 These
constitutional issues deserve critical and immediate attention by Florida's
attorneys, judges, and legislators.
B. The ConstitutionalFlaws in Florida'sDeath
Penalty Scheme
Over the past twenty-six years, the constitutionality of Florida's capital
sentencing scheme has been repeatedly examined by the United States
Supreme Court. 4 0 During this time, the State of Florida has executed fiftythree capital defendants, relying on the Court's holdings that Florida's
capital sentencing statute was constitutional.' 41 With this clear precedent,
why does the Ring decision suddenly cast doubt on the constitutionality of
Florida's death penalty procedure?
1. The Florida Trial Judge Acts Alone in Finding Aggravating
Factors Necessary to Sentence a Defendant to Death
Florida's sentencing statute requires a finding of aggravating factors
before the death penalty may be imposed. 42 The trial judge alone makes
the factual determination as to whether an aggravating factor is present.'43

138. See Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 697 (Wells, J., concurring); King, 831 So. 2d at 144. As
Justice Wells stated:
To reach the conclusion that Ring somehow undermines Florida's capital
sentencing scheme as it was applied to King or Bottoson, it is necessary to
conclude that the United States Supreme Court made the decision to terminate the
King and Bottoson stays of execution even though Ring rendered Florida's statute
unconstitutional as it had been applied to King and Bottoson. I cannot conclude
that the United States Supreme Court would have permitted King and Bottoson
to be executed if that court determined that Ring invalidated the death sentences
imposed in these cases.
Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 697 (Wells, J., concurring).
139. See Bonoson, 833 So. 2d at 703-734 (Anstead, C.J., Lewis, Pariente & Shaw, JJ.,
concurring); King, 831 So. 2d at 148-56 (Anstead, C.J., Lewis, Pariente, & Shaw, JJ., concurring).
140. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984);
Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518 (1997).
141. Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 698 (Wells, J., concurring).
142. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 2002).
143. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West 2002) provides in relevant part: "In each case in
which the court imposes the death sentence, the determination of the court shall be supported by
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It is this factual determination that is relied upon by the same judge in
determining whether the defendant should be sentenced to death.'
Furthermore, it is this factual determination that is reviewed by the Florida
Supreme Court in determining
whether the judge imposed an appropriate
45
sentence in the case.
This judicial fact-finding procedure was first described by the Florida
Supreme Court in Grossman v. State.146 The trial judge holds a sentencing
hearing to give the defendant, his counsel, and the State an opportunity to
be heard. 47 During this hearing, the judge must afford both the State and
the defendant an opportunity to present evidence.14 Furthermore, thejudge
must allow, if appropriate, the State and the defendant to challenge any
information in a medical report, and allow the defendant to testify in
person. 4 After the hearing, the judge should recess. 50 If the judge
determines that the death sentence is appropriate, then the judge must set
forth in writing all judicial findings of fact and reasons for imposing the
death sentence.' 5 ' The judge is free to find aggravating circumstances and
facts that have never been presented to a jury. 2
Florida's sentencing scheme is flawed because it permits the trial
judge, not the jury, to make findings of fact to determine the existence of
aggravating factors necessary for imposing the death sentence.' 53 Ring
clearly holds that capital defendants are entitled to a jury determination of
any finding of fact necessary to establish an aggravating factor and impose
the death penalty. 5 4 Florida's law ignores Ring's mandate and leaves life
specific written findings of fact based upon the circumstances..,. See also Bottoson, 833 So. 2d
at 710 (Anstead, C.J., concurring) (stating that, "in Florida, the responsibility for determining
whether and which aggravating circumstances apply to a particular defendant falls squarely upon
the trial judge").
144. Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 704 (Anstead, C.J., concurring).
145. See id. (Anstead, C.J., concurring).
146. 525 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1988) (per curiam).
147. Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 707 (Anstead, C.J., concurring).
148. Id. (Anstead, C.J., concurring).
149. Id. (Anstead, C.J., concurring).
150. Id. (Anstead, C.J., concurring).
151. Id. (Anstead, C.J., concurring).
152. See id (Anstead, C.J., concurring); see also Davis v. State, 703 So. 2d 1055, 1061 (Fla.
1997) ("We have held that it is not error for ajudge to consider and find an aggravator that was not
presented to or found by the jury."); Sims v. State, 681 So. 2d 1112, 1118 (Fla. 1996) (stating "that
the court did not commit error by finding an aggravating circumstance" which was not submitted
to the jury); Engle v. State, 438 So. 2d 803, 813 (Fla. 1983) (holding that the trial judge is "not
limited in sentencing to consideration of only that material before the jury" but is given "final
authority to determine the appropriate sentence").
153. See Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 705 (Anstead, C.J., concurring).
154. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2439. According to Justice Scalia, the right of trial by jury is in
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and death fact-finding and sentencing power in the hands of the judge, and
not the jury.155
2. The Florida Trial Judge May Override the Jury's Advisory
Sentencing Recommendation
The Florida jury does play a role in the sentencing of capital
defendants.' 56 However, the jury merely provides the judge with an
advisory recommendation."5 When the jury provides its recommendation
to the judge, it is not required to find specific aggravating factors.' 58
Furthermore, the
jury's recommendation is only that-a
59
recommendation.'
The sentencing judge is supposed to give the jury's recommendation
great weight. 60 Yet, empirical data suggests that Floridajudges frequently
perilous decline, and that decline is bound to be accelerated
by the repeated spectacle of a man's going to his death because ajudge found that
an aggravating factor existed. We cannot preserve our veneration for the
protection of the jury in criminal cases if we render ourselves callous to the need
for that protection by regularly imposing the death penalty without it.
Id. at 2445 (Scalia, J., concurring).
155. See Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 725 (Pariente, J., concurring) (stating that "[u]nder both the
Florida and Arizona schemes, it is the judge who independently finds the aggravators necessary to
impose the death sentence").
156. Id. 833 So. 2d at 716 (Shaw, J., concurring).
157. See id. (Shaw, J., concurring). The judge instructs the jury to make an advisory
recommendation, stating:
"If a majority of the jury determine that (defendant) should be sentenced to
death, your advisory sentence will be:
A majority of the jury, by a vote of_
, advise and recommend to the court
that it impose the death penalty upon (defendant).
On the other hand, if by six or more votes the jury determines that (defendant)
should not be sentenced to death, your advisory sentence will be:
The jury advises and recommends to the court that it impose a sentence of life
imprisonment upon (defendant) without possibility of parole.
You will now retire to consider your recommendation. When you have
reached an advisory sentence in conformity with these instructions, that form of
recommendation should be signed by your foreperson and returned to the court."
Id. (Shaw, J., concurring) (quoting FLA. STD. JURY INST. (CRIM.) 7.11).
158. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. "[F]rom a jury's bare advisory
recommendation, it would be impossible to tell which, if any, aggravating circumstances ajury or
any individual juror may have determined existed." Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 708 (Anstead, C.J.,
concurring).
159. See id. (Anstead, C.J., concurring).
160. See, e.g., Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975) ("A jury recommendation
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override juries' sentencing recommendations in death penalty cases.' 6 '
Between December of 1972 and March of 1988, 526 death sentences were
imposed by the Florida courts. 62 Of those sentences, 113 were cases in
which the judge overrode the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment
and imposed the death sentence. 163 To be sure, the trial judge is ultimately
responsible for the sentencing decision, and therefore bases the sentence
on an independent determination of aggravating factors, not necessarily the
jury's recommendation. 164
3. The Florida Jury's Advisory Sentencing Recommendation
Need Not Be Unanimous
In Florida, the jury's advisory recommendation in a death penalty case
need not be unanimous. 65 According to the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Ring, however, factors in sentencing a defendant to
death-much like the elements of a crime-must be found by a unanimous
jury vote. 66 Certainly, in all other critical determinations in a Florida
criminal trial, the jury must reach decisions unanimously. 67 For example,
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.440 requires that a jury may render
a verdict in a criminal trial only if it is unanimous. 61However, in making
the ultimate sentencing determination between life in prison and death,
69
Floridajuries may offer their recommendation by a mere majority vote.1
The fact that Florida juries do not have to reach their recommendation
unanimously is squarely at odds with the Sixth Amendment and the

under our trifurcated death penalty statute should be given great weight.").
161. See Michael Mello, The Jurisdictionto Do Justice:Florida'sJury Override andthe State
Constitution, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 924, 924-25 (1991).
162. Id.
163. Id. "Thus, one in five people sentenced to die in Florida had jury recommendations of
life." Id.
164. Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 708 (Anstead, J., concurring). As Florida Statute § 921.141(3)
provides: "Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court, after weighing
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.414(3) (West 2002).
death ......
165. Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 710 (Anstead, C.J., concurring).
166. See Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2441.
167. Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 710 (Anstead, C.J., concurring).
168. Id. (Anstead, C.J., concurring); see alsoFLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.440 (2002) ("No verdict may
be rendered unless all the trial jurors concur in it."); FLA. STD.JURY INST. (CRIM.) 3.10 ("Whatever
verdict you render must be unanimous, that is, each juror must agree to the same verdict."). Florida
courts have long held that ajury's verdict must be unanimous to be valid. See, e.g., Jones v. State,
92 So. 2d 261,261 (Fla. 1957) ("In this state, the verdict of the jury must be unanimous."); Patrick
v. Young, 18 Fla. 50, 51 (1891) ("The record of a verdict implies a unanimous consent of the jury,
and is conclusive evidence of that fact.").
169. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court's decision in Ring. 7 '
C. ProposedRemedies to Florida'sFlawedDeath Penalty Scheme
Justice Wells is one of the few Justices on the Florida Supreme Court
to assert that Florida's death penalty statute is still constitutional in light
of Ring. 7 ' It is significant to note that in Bottoson Justice Wells did not
offer an ardent defense of the Florida death penalty scheme as it currently
operates.' 72 He did not defend the fact that Florida judges, acting alone,
find the aggravating factors necessary to impose the death penalty.'73 Nor
did he attempt to justify the fact that the jury's role in Florida's death
penalty sentencing scheme is merely to make a non-unanimous, nonbinding advisory recommendation.'74 Rather, Justice Wells warned that if
the Florida death penalty statute were found to be unconstitutional, it
would have "a catastrophic effect on the administration of justice in
Florida.""'
The greater constitutional catastrophe, however, is to deny capital
defendants their Sixth Amendment right to have their case fully decided by
a jury of their peers, a right that has been a bedrock principle of our
criminal justice system since the Bill of Rights was enacted. Several
Justices on the Florida Supreme Court, including Justices Anstead, Shaw,
Pariente, and Lewis recognized in Bottoson that the Supreme Court's
decision in Ring profoundly impacts the constitutionality of the Florida
sentencing statute, and the issue demands immediate attention.' 76 So, as
Justice7 7Anstead wondered, "[t]he question is where do we go from
here."'

1. Judicial Action to Ameliorate the Constitutionality of
Florida's Death Penalty Scheme
The Florida Supreme Court may take two initial steps to bolster the

170. Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 710 (Anstead, C.J., concurring).
171. See id. at 696-99 (Wells, J., concurring).
172. See id. (Wells, J., concurring).
173. See id. (Wells, J., concurring).
174. See id. (Wells, J., concurring).
175. Id. at 698 (Wells, J., concurring). In Justice Wells's view, the catastrophic effects would
include the fact that all of Florida's death row inmates may have new, constitutional grounds for
challenging their sentences. Id. at 699 (Wells, J., concurring). Justice Wells argued that such
challenges would pose enormous practical problems--especially given the fact that, in most death
penalty appeals, many years have passed since the defendant was first senten6ed to death. See id.
(Wells, J., concurring). "Evidence will clearly have grown stale or have been lost or destroyed,
witnesses will be unavailable, and memories will surely have faded." Id. (Wells, J., concurring).
176. Id. at 695-734 (Anstead, C.J., Lewis, Pariente, & Shaw, JJ., concurring).
177. Id. at 703 (Anstead, C.J., concurring).
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constitutionality of Florida's death penalty scheme. First, Florida's
sentencing instructions currently focus on the jury's advisory role and
minimize the obligation of the jury under Ring to find aggravating
factors.' 8 Justices Lewis, Pariente, and Shaw propose that these
instructions be immediately rewritten.'79 Jurors must understand that it is
their responsibility to evaluate facts in sentencing and determine if any
aggravating factors are present in a capital case.'
Second, the Florida Supreme Court should require juries to utilize
special verdict forms, which would clearly indicate any aggravating factors
found by the jury in a capital case.'' The jury would be required to record
its vote as to each aggravating factor on the form. 2 This special verdict
form would provide more guidance to the judge, and would clarify the
reasons for the jury's sentencing recommendation.8 3 Arguably, the jury's
advice as to the ultimate sentence would carry more weight with the court
if the judge had a better understanding of the reasons behind the jury's
recommendation. Furthermore, requiring a jury to record its vote as to
each aggravating factor in sentencing a defendant to death would impress
upon jurors the gravity of their decisions.'
2. Legislative Action to Ameliorate the Constitutionality of
Florida's Death Penalty Scheme
Ultimately, the Florida Legislature must follow the lead ofthe Arizona,
Colorado, Delaware, and Nebraska legislatures' 85 and rewrite the Florida
death penalty sentencing statutes to meet the constitutional mandate of
Ring. The Florida Legislature has previously flirted with repealing the socalled jury override provision." 6 If the Florida Legislature is concerned
with the continued viability of capital punishment, it must act proactively
to ameliorate the many constitutional flaws in Florida's death penalty
sentencing statutes.
The Florida Legislature should assert that a death sentence may be
imposed only when a jury first determines unanimously and beyond a

178. Id. at 723 (Pariente, J., concurring).
179. Id. at 723, 731 (Lewis, Pariente, & Shaw, JJ., concurring).
180. Id. at 723 (Pariente, J., concurring).
181. Id. (Pariente, J., concurring).
182. Id. (Pariente, J., concurring).
183. Id. at 724 (Pariente, J., concurring).
184. This proposal would address one of Justice Lewis' chief concerns with the current death
penalty jury instructions: "I question whether ajury in situations such as this can have the proper
sense of responsibility with regard to finding aggravating factors or the true importance of such
finding as now emphasized by Ring." Id. at 734 (Lewis, J., concurring).
185. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
186. See Mello, supra note 161, at 938-39.
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reasonable doubt that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance
exists. 8 7 The jury's determination would therefore be more than a mere
recommendation; it would be binding on the court, and subject to appellate
review. Such legislative reform would bring Florida's sentencing statutes
into alignment with the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a trial by jury, and
the Court's decisions in Apprendi and Ring.
V. CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona is the
most important death penalty decision since the Court's landmark case of
Furman v. Georgia thirty years ago.'88 In Ring, the Court reaffirmed the
fundamental Sixth Amendment right of capital defendants to a jury
determination of any fact on which the State may impose the ultimate
penalty of death.189 A man's right to be judged by his peers is a safeguard
that must be held in the highest esteem. 9 ° The jury's voice is the
commonsense voice of the community. In a democratic society, one free
from official or judicial coercion, it is a voice that must be protected and
cherished.
Florida's death penalty sentencing statutes do not uphold these Sixth
Amendment ideals. The Florida jury plays only a minimal role in deciding
on the sentence of the capital defendant. It is the most momentous decision

made in the American criminal justice system, and yet the Florida jury
remains on the sidelines. Now, in light of the Court's holding in Ring, the
Florida Supreme Court and the Florida Legislature must act to restore the
voice of the people in making the extraordinary decision of whether a man,
as punishment for his crime, should face the ultimate penalty of death.

187. The Florida law would thus closely mirror new sentencing schemes in Arizona, Colorado,
Delaware, and Nebraska as well as other states which entrust fact-finding and sentencing decisions
to the jury. See supra notes 6, 20 and accompanying text.
188. Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 703 (Anstead, C.J., concurring).
189. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2433.
190. See ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT INMODERN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE:
A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 183 (1992).
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